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ABSTRACT 
As an allied nation, it appears logical and Malaysia faced various problems which are 
similar. Some time ago, Indonesia was tested with a variety of horizontal conflicts and 
other violence or irregularities are not moral values such as corruption, violation of 
ethics and moral, liberal democracy that went too far so that violate moral values as a 
nation and akhlakul karimah East and religious nation . The problem that is almost the 
same but in a smaller scale and still in control also occurs in Malaysia.  
These problems then raises questions about the role and contribution of the Islamic 
Religious Education in the form of social ethics. Despite the growth variable is actually 
a very complex problem, but often directly or indirectly connected with the failure of 
religious education in schools. Questions like these are considered legitimate because 
the source of many problems is due to ethical and moral crisis, while the role of 
religious education is to form students have a morality and a noble moral character.  
This study aims to: First, get an overview and analysis of core beliefs  and the core 
values  are extracted from the formal curriculum and the hidden curriculum of Islamic 
Education (PAI) in Senior High School  in Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, get an 
overview and analysis of how implementation of the PAI and its influence in students 
mindset and commitment to social ethics and peace. Third, get an overview and analysis 
of the implementation of social ethics and a culture of peace that was developed at the 
school, especially in relation to the implementation of the PAI. The research was 
conducted in two schools / madrasah in Malang, Indonesia and the three national 
schools in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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The role of Islamic education in shaping the social ethic of brotherhood and peace as 
developed in the schools studied are as follows: Husnuzhan (be kind to one other 
suspect). Tasamuh (tolerate the taste, knitting harmony), Takrim (casting awards, reap 
the honor), Tafahum (maintaining mutual understanding, build mutual understanding), 
Amanah (maintaining the trust, taking responsibility), Ihsan (knit solidarity, demanding 
the sacrifice), Fastabiqul Khayrat ( racing achievement), reconciliation (peacefully 
resolve the conflict), 'Afw (plant forgiveness, reap forgiveness), sulh (build a culture of 
peace in your life together). (2) non-violence: 'adl (upholding the balance, reaching for 
justice), Lyn (softness-violent anti-fruit of mercy and good deeds). Salam (peace in the 
hearts of peace on earth). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until recently only a few studies have been proposed to account the relations 
between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Most of them are dealing with premodern era 
(Azra 2004, Basri 2008, Laffar 2003, Mas’ud 1997). While this lack of initiatives in 
some parts can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of the Saudi regime, most of the 
studies have entertained the idea that the relations are static and that most of the Saudi 
education projects are largely directed to support state ideology (Al Rasheed 2007, 
Okruhlik 2004). This assumption does not have strong evidence. Many things have 
changed over the last decades. Throughout this article I argue that, on the one hand, it is 
becoming more obvious that these relations have been characterized by patron-client 
relations. On the other hand, it involves a wide range of actors thereby allowing the 
diversity of knowledge reproduction.  
This article deals with LIPIA, a Saudi education project and its network with 
Indonesian graduates. These returning graduates are currently serving in various 
positions such as teachers and preachers. In the course of time they have maintained 
relations with Saudi, from which they obtain financial supports. It focuses on students 
who studied in Saudi in recent periods precisely in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Their 
understandings of Sharia have changed over the time depending its contexts.  
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country. It has played an important role 
in shaping the politics of regional and global Muslim world. This fact attracts Saudi 
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Arabia, which has attempted to become the dominant player in Muslim politics. Over 
the last three decades, it has made a big investment on the field of education by building 
Islamic schools and institutes, distributing scholarship for Indonesian students, and 
channeling aid for Muslim organizations. It is becoming obvious that Saudi uses 
education as a political strategy to maintain its influences over Indonesia.  
 
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic State 
More than any other country in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is identified 
with Islam. Islam is the religion of the state, its source of political legitimacy, shaping 
state policies, and serving as the moral code of society. The formation of the state of 
Saudi Arabia is a result of the political leadership of Muhammad ibn Saud (1702-1765), 
the founder of Saudi Arabia, and the puritan religious group led by Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab (1703-1792).  
Despite that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, its daily politics, economics and 
governance is secular. Saudi is one of the Muslim states which has long allied with the 
Western countries to guarantee its survival. It is a rent-seeking state which invites 
Western companies to explore its natural resources. Contrary to this, the ulama have 
played an important role particularly in shaping public policies on education and 
women’s affairs (Al-Rasheed 2007, Okruhlik 2004).  
Articulate Islamic movements in Saudi did not emerge until the 1970s. The rise 
of young educated Saudi generation, many of whom studied in the West, the availability 
of technology and communication system, the growing fragmentation of authority, 
perpetuated the movements. These movements were aggravated by the two-week 
occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. This occupation, led by Juhaiman 
al-Utaibi and Mohammad al-Qahtani, had a great impact on its further development. 
Radical Islamist groups accused the regime of having deviated from the straight path of 
Islam, being subjugated to the power of the infidels, resorting to crimes, corruption, and 
violation against the Muslim believers. The rebel can be easily oppressed, but clearly 
revealed the idea that the regime was so vulnerable (Okruhlik 2004, 2005).  
In response to this, King Fahd sought Islamic legitimacy by changing his title 
from “His Majesty,” to “Custodian of the Holy Cities” in 1986. This was followed by 
his deliberation to tighten up public polices and social life. Gender segregation was 
more profound, and the mutawwa (Shari’a police) were given more leeway to inspect 
and arrest the dissents. Furthermore, he also proposed major reforms in Saudi education 
system. New campuses and world-class universities were built across the country, more 
scholarship given to students, religious shrines refurbished and renovated, and exchange 
programs with Muslim countries including Indonesia set up. All these things were made 
up to bolster the image that Saudi Arabia was center of Islamic learning. 
  367 
Education beyond Border 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia sought to promote its education 
system beyond its borders. Universities and institutes specializing on Shari’a were 
erected at home and abroad. These institutions were made to accommodate the ulama 
who become state notables. This period also witnessed the channeling of Saudi funds to 
other Muslim countries through formal and informal institutions. Most of the funds 
were distributed through Islamic philanthropist organizations and humanitarian flags. 
But since the roles of ulama were significant, this project has been affected by a 
particular religious spirit called Salafism.  
LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic) is the first and the largest 
Saudi project in Indonesia. It was founded in 1980 in Jakarta. This institute is extremely 
important since it shapes the subsequent transmission of Salafism to Indonesia. This can 
be seen in the fact that most of the Indonesian Salafi leaders previously studied at this 
institute. They are credited of transforming Islamic movements of the 1970s and 1980s 
and linking them to transnational and global organizations.  
The foundation of the LIPIA is an uneasy step. It is made possible by a number 
of factors. It goes back to the 1970s when Suharto approached depolitization of Islam. 
Some Islamic organizations in the country approached Saudi Arabia. In response to this, 
Syeikh Abd al-Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a prominent student of Syeikh Abdullah bin 
Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, made a short visit to Jakarta. Mohammad Natsir, a prominent 
Indonesian Muslim figure, welcomed him. He fully supported the idea to build an 
Islamic institute. Natsir was the founder of Masyumi (the largest Islamic party during 
Sukarno’s era and the chief executive of the DDII (Indonesian Muslim Promulgation 
Commission). He approached Indonesian officials, most of whom were the high-rank 
officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.  
Daoed Joesoef, Ministry of Education and Culture and a secularist-nationalist, 
refused to give permission to this idea. Alamsjah, Ministry for Religious Affairs, who 
supported the idea, came to Joesoep asked the matter. The latter responded that Muslims 
were already fanatics. If they studied at an Islamic institute, they would become even 
more fanatical. Alamsyah slammed Joesoep. This brawl eventually led to Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with the operation of the 
institute (Mujiburrahman 2006).   
Located in a rent building in Salemba Central Jakarta, still called LPBA 
(Institute for Arabic Teaching), the institute began its mission in 1980. The class was 
held in the afternoon, to give the opportunity for other students who had activities in the 
morning. For the first time in the Indonesian history, Arabic was introduced to public in 
highly sophisticated manner. All the teachers were natives. They were Arabs (Saudi, 
Egyptian, Sudanese, Yemeni, etc).  
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With two-rent buildings located in South Jakarta, LIPIA has now more than 
2500 students, around 25 percent of them female. It has nowadays become one of the 
main destinations for study. The availability of scholarship is really appealing especially 
for poor students. It is obvious that Saudi uses scholarship as a means of disseminating 
its ideology beyond its territorial borders. Whereas experiencing various problems at the 
beginning and gains less attention from most Muslim groups, in its further development 
the LIPIA successfully creates network with Muslim organizations. It gradually recruits 
students particularly of the modernist backgrounds such as DDII, Persis, al-Irshad, and 
Muhammadiyah. It is obvious that, having the same spirit of puritanism, the modernists 
are involved in such an intensely religious engagement. The traditionalist Muslim group 
such NU is not really involved in such an undertaking.  
As far as the LIPIA is concerned, there are two things necessary to be 
highlighted here. First, it has become the Saudi most important institution in Indonesia. 
Its graduates have played an important role in transmitting and disseminating a model of 
Islam called Salafism by creating various foundations working on education and social 
programs all over the country. Second, its graduates have good access to state or semi-
state relief organizations and individual philanthropists in the Middle East and, as a 
result, bring home new financial sources.  
LIPIA is a form of state accommodation toward ulama. This can be seen in the 
prestigious position of ulama in its structure. They are given high salaries, apartment, 
car, living cost, and tickets for home holidays. The professors of Sharia are given the 
highest positions. They are charged with the teaching of fiqh, hadith, and ushul al-din. 
Besides Shari’a, Arabic is extremely important. This institute is created to promote 
Arabic as the language of Islam and an international language. Thanks to LIPIA, Arabic 
has been widely used especially by Muslim scholars. All the subjects are given in 
Arabic, and all students being required to take Arabic. The Saudis are very dominant 
within the institute. Non-Saudi Arabs such as Egyptians, Sudanese, Yemenis, are also 
important due to their language skills. However, they are paid less. Indonesians are at 
the bottom of the hierarchy. They are paid the least.  
 
The salaries of the LIPIA professors and staffs (in Saudi riyal) 
Degree/position Saudi Non-Saudi Indonesia 
Doctor 15000-25000 6000-9000 6000-8000  
Magister  3000-4000 3000-4000 
Undergraduate - - 2500 
Staff 13.000-18.000  800-1000 
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The wide gap between the Saudis and non-Saudis, the Arabs and non-Arab, 
frequently leads to conflict. One of the conflicts which raises public attention, at least to 
some, is the case of Muhammad Zaini, a staff working with the institute for more than 
fifteen years. The conflict began when Zaini, a Banjarese, demanded the institute raised 
his salary. At that time he was only paid 800 riyal per month. The institute asked him to 
be patient as the government planned to make a new policy. After some time, he found 
out nothing happened. Once again, the institute asked him to be patient a little more. He 
waited for the second time. However, after some times, nothing happened. This made 
him resigned from his position. The bitterest experience is that the Saudis never showed 
respect for others. In his protest to the director, he said that only stupid person and a 
donkey who worked in this institute.  
Zaini’s case may reflect a broader picture of the LIPIA management. In spite of 
its modern technology, it is poorly managed. The recruitment of teachers and students 
involve personal and informal ties. This also happens in salary system. According to 
Zaini, the institute does not have a standard for salary payment. Instead it depends on 
negotiation between professors and the institute. The highest salary an Indonesian 
professor has ever obtained is that of Salim Segaf al-Jufri, which is 8000 riyal per 
month. Al-Jufri is one of the Indonesian who successfully create links with Saudi. He 
previously studied at Islamic University of Medina and assumed key positions in 
WAMY (World Association Muslim Youth) and International Saudi Relief. He has 
been credited of creating link between Islamic organizations particularly founded by the 
Saudi graduates with donor institutions in the Middle East. 
LIPIA has consistently applied the curriculum which orients students to acquire 
a complete knowledge of Islamic traditional scholarship. This results in the rigid nature 
of their religious practices e.g. gender segregation, women’s seclusion, and the stress on 
outward disciplines such as having long beards (lihya), Arab-style flowering robes 
(jalabiya), and shortening pants right up ankles (isbal), and women’s wearing a form of 
enveloping black veil (burqa).  
Furthermore the institute teaches traditional Islamic scholarship especially those 
of the Hanbali school. A collection of Hanbali books are found in the library. Students 
are required to take all courses related to this school. Despite other Sunni scholarship 
are available, the collections are limited. Neither the works of al-Ghazali, a Sunni 
theologian and philosopher (d. in 1111), nor those of Ibn Arabi, a Muslim mystic (d. 
1240), are available. The only classical book available and widely used in the institute is 
Bidayatul Mujtahid, composed by Ibn Rushd (d. in 1198). Modern Islamic works by the 
Salafi ulama are available. The works of Syeikh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, died 
in 1999, and Syeikh Abdullah al-Uthaimin, died in 2001, are abundant. The institute 
also emphasizes on the importance of the memorization of the Koran and the Hadith. 
Some scholarship are given to students memorizing the hadith at most.  
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List of the textbooks in the Faculty of Sharia and Takmili of LIPIA Jakarta 
No.  Subject Books Author School of 
thought 
(madhhab) 
1 Al-Qur’an 8 chapter   
2 Fiqih 1. Bidayatul Mujtahid Wa 
Nihayatul Muqtashid 
2. Mukhtashar Abi Suja’ 
Matan Ghayah Taqrib dalam 
Fiqh Syafii 
Ibnu Rusyd 
 
Abu Syuja’ 
Maliki 
 
Syafii 
3 Hadith Subul al-Salam Syarh Bulug al-
Maram 
Al-San’ani Previously 
Zaidi moved 
to Zahiri 
4 Musthalah Hadith Taysir Musthalah Hadith   
5 Tafsir Fathul Qadir al-Jami bayna 
Fanni Riwayah wa Dirayah 
Al-Syawkani Previously 
Zaidi moved 
to Salafi 
6 Nahwu 1. Syarh Ibn Aqil untuk 
Alfiyah ibn Malik 
2. Awdhahul Masalik li 
Alfiyah ibn Malik 
  
7 Ushul Fiqh/Qawaid 
Fiqhiyah  
1. Raudhatul al-Nadhir 
Wa Jannat al-Munadhir 
2. Al-Mumta’a fi al-
Qawaid al-Fiqhiyah 
Ibn Qudamah 
 
Dr. Muslim bin 
Muhammad bin 
Majid al-Dawsi 
Hanbali 
8 Tauhid 1. Al-Qaul al-Mufid ala 
Kitab al-Tauhid 
 
2. Syarh al-Aqidah al-
Thahawiyah 
 
3. Al-Aqidah 
Muhammad bin 
Salih al-
Uthaimin 
 
Ibn Abd –Uzz 
al-Dimasqi 
Shalih bin 
Fauzan Ali 
Fauzan 
 
9 Mawaris Attahqiqat al-Mardhiyah fil 
Mabahis al-Fardhiyah 
Shalih bin 
Fauzan ali 
Fauzan 
 
10 Tsaqafah al- Al-Kutub al-Mukhtalifah Dr. Rashid al-  
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No.  Subject Books Author School of 
thought 
(madhhab) 
Islamiyah Rijal 
11 Mashadir al-Bahthi Al-Kutub al-Mutkhtalifah Dr. Rashid al-
Rijal 
 
 
As I argued earlier, the Saudi uses scholarship as a means to promote its 
education system. In relation to LIPIA, all students are given scholarship (mukafa’ah) 
for 200 riyal every month. They are also given all textbooks for free. This scholarship is 
really important especially for poor students who cannot afford high education due to 
financial problems. Apart from this, the Saudi also provides financial supports 
distributed through its international organizations for Salafi organizations in Indonesia. 
A Wahdah preacher in Makassar South Sulawesi admits that he had been financially 
supported by the Saudi in the mid 1990s. It is heard that a number of prominent Saudi 
graduates have been given kafalah (social security). Saudi Islamic Relief (Haia Igathah 
al-Islamiyah al-Saudiyah) and Saudi Religious Affairs (Mulhaq Dini) are central in 
distributing funds to Salafi communities in Indonesia. This does not include funds 
provided by Middle East individual philanthropists whose names can be found in the 
inscriptions on the walls of Salafi mosques across the country.  
 
Creating Salafi Identity 
Identity is extremely important for the Salafis. It is created through several ways, 
formal and informal. The formal ways consist of training in which new cadres are 
introduced to the Salafi teachings. Informal ways consist of all forms of social life. 
Identity is maintained and reproduced through physical appearance, formal and informal 
socialization.  
Gender is highly enforced in all forms of social life. This fact is one of the most striking 
features of the Salafis. In LIPIA, female and male students use the library on every 
other day. Female students are taught by female teachers, male students by male 
teachers. Most of the female students are covering up their bodies (burqa). Some have 
veiling (niqab). Dating is prohibited, marriage recommended. If male and female 
students like each other, they could go to seniors or teachers to arrange marriage. It 
should be registered and with the notification of parents.  
The ideology of Salafism is further disseminated among others through prayer. 
Prayer is the most important ritual in Islam, and mosque serves the locus where identity 
making is taking place. Despite prayer can be performed individually, it is better to 
perform it collectively. By performing collective prayers, students are involved in face-
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to-face communication with others. Conversation, expressions, shaking hand, kissing, 
hugging and patting are quite common and ritualized. Performing collective prayer will 
give deep impact and raise strong in-group feelings on each member of the believers.  
Collective prayer, highly recommended, is strategized in such a way to directly 
contribute to identity-making process. Ideally there is only one collective prayer for one 
community in each prayer time. The second, the third, the fourth prayer, would only be 
justified if there are reasons to do so. To make all the believers aware of and to give 
them chance to come to the mosque, the intervals between prayer call and prayer are 
made longer. While in non-Salafi mosques, it is around five to ten minutes, in Salafi 
mosques, however, it takes fifteen to thirty minutes.  
The numerous collective prayers has been discussed in many Salafi publication 
as to whether it is justified to perform collective prayer in one mosque for more than 
once. To this question, there are several answers. First, the second, the third, the fourth 
collective prayers are justified if the capacity of mosque is limited. Second, the second, 
the third, the fourth collective prayers are justified if there is no regular imam. Third, it 
is unlawful if there is a regular imam and the mosque can accommodate all the 
congregants. It is easy to understand this rule. By making only one collective prayer, all 
the members of the community are seeing each other thereby contributing to the 
strengthening of their identities.  
 
The Diversity of Knowledge       
 The Saudi education projects involve such a wide range of actors as students, 
teachers, religious scholars, activists. All of them are having different interests that 
makes the reproduction of knowledge multi-faceted, complex, and ever-changing 
phenomenon. This is a result that actors have different backgrounds and live in largely 
overlapping social settings. The LIPIA itself has gradually changed to adjust to the 
existing conditions. This can be seen in the fact that it begins to get involved in such 
public discourses as pluralism and civil rights.  
Throughout this article, I will use the term Salafism to denote the process of the 
reproduction of knowledge taking place within LIPIA and other Saudi-funded 
institutions in Indonesia. Salafism is a form of Islam which calls on the Muslim people 
to return to the pristine sources of Islam. This term has historical precedence that goes 
back as early as the first century of Islamic history.  It is also evidently safer and more 
fruitful during my interviews with professor and students. Despite that the Salafi groups 
have different understanding on Salafism, they agree on the extent to which Salafism is 
defined such as the primacy of the religious resources such as al-Qur’an and al-Sunnah 
over rational approaches towards religion.  
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In regard to religious innovation (bid’ah), which becomes one of the most salient 
features of Salafism, there have been different ideas. Many groups are quite flexible, 
while others are extremely strict. Some Salafi groups use bid’ah as a weapon to attack 
other Muslim groups to gain sympathy and popularity. They publish various books on 
the danger of bid’ah. This strategy seems to have attracted particular Muslim groups to 
join Salafism and become its members. Other Salafi groups prefer to take low profile 
approaches to promote its ideas and programs. The controversy of bid’ah has recently 
reemerged after the rise of Salafim. In the previous times, it divided the modernist and 
traditionalist Muslim groups and brought a deep impact on social and political life. The 
former accused the latter of creating various bid’ah in their religious practices. The 
latter argued that not all the bid’ah were forbidden. Good bid’ah (bid’ah hasanah) was 
permissible.  
In the previous times, debates on bid’ah took place in mosques or madrasah. 
Thus the opposing groups deliberately defended their arguments in public spheres 
attended by ordinary Muslim population. Recent debates, however, are taking place 
impersonally thanks to the advancement of technology. The Salafis use internet, CD, 
radio, books, to advocate their ideas. As a result there is no physical contact between 
both groups. As far as I am concerned there has been no physical violence between the 
Salafis and non-Salafis taking place in the country.  
Whether the Salafi are interested on such contemporary issues as civil right and 
democracy. This question is crucial since there has been suspicion among other Muslim 
groups against the Salafis that the latter might not support civil right and democracy. 
While these issues have never been so intensely discussed, there is a growing concern 
among the Salafis to get engage more seriously in such public discourses. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11, many Islamist groups began to discuss, with a varying degree of 
acceptance, on democracy and civil right. This indicates that there has been a constant 
change on the reproduction of knowledge among the Salafis. Nowadays, it is hardly 
surprising that the LIPIA holds seminar in cooperation with Indonesian police in an 
attempt to combat terrorism and radicalism that sparks upon the country over a decade. 
This development brought about a deep impact on other Salafi groups.  
Based on my interviews, the Salafis oppose the term democracy. This term, they 
believe, is a Western concept alien to Islam. Instead they propose the term ahl al-hall 
wa’l ‘aqd, literally meaning the commission having the right to legislate and abrogate 
the laws, a concept quite similar to ‘indirect democracy’ in the Western sense. The 
Salafis oppose ‘direct democracy’ since it likens a learned person having the knowledge 
of God, with a layman. Distancing themselves from real politics, the Salafi do not vote 
during the general election. It is hardly ever found that they vote for particular 
candidates. Despite the Salafis prevent formal politic, they argue that it is important for 
Muslim to give advice to the rulers. This is the most common Salafi political attitude. 
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Other Salafi groups such as Wahdah Islamiyah of Makassar consider politics as 
something important to improve the quality of public life. Politics is a means by which 
leaders are selected based on their capacities. This can be seen, for instance, it supports 
Ilham Arif Sirajuddin, the incumbent mayor of Makassar to go for gubernatorial 
election to be held next year.  
It is becoming clear that the reproduction of knowledge among the Salafis 
widely vary depending upon their understanding on Islamic teachings, backgrounds and 
social settings. The assumption that Salafism is a form of Saudi propaganda is 
obviously mistaken. This assumption simplifies the fact that Salafism has historical 
precedence and always bears the spirit of reform as its salient feature. Moreover, the 
idea that Salafis promotes radicalism and extremism on the one hand and absolute 
quietism in another, as reflected in bitterly contested terms such as jihadist versus non-
jihadist, do really depict its entirety. The entire picture is that it covers up issues ranging 
from religious reform, education, economy, social, and culture. This is not to say that 
Salafism is free from patronage, political propaganda, and its fusion with other 
ideologies. As I said earlier, before reaching Indonesian coastlines, Salafism has 
constantly evolved absorbing locally established ideologies.  
 
The Multiplicity of Sharia 
In the aftermath of 9/11, LIPIA began to get involve in discussing such 
discourses as democracy and civil society.  It was a part of campaign against terrorism. 
Many Islamic organizations were encouraged to get engage in this campaign. This 
period witnessed the rise of public awareness of the danger of terrorism and radicalism. 
Programs and research on terrorism had been made. It was for the first time a large 
number of Islamic organizations discussed more seriously such issues. Before that these 
issues had never been given enough attention especially by the Islamists. LIPIA was 
frequently invited by authorities such as Contra-terrorism National Office (BNPT) to 
discuss the effective ways to combat radicalism and terrorism.  
It is very likely that LIPIA is concerned with the fact that some people have 
been suspicious towards the institute as it might have promoted radicalism and 
extremism in the country. It therefore holds seminar and conference to explain to the 
public that it has nothing to do with terrorism and radicalism. It also made several 
roadshows to Islamic high schools and pesantren to recruit students. These attempts are 
positive and reassure the public that the institute is not charged with those allegations.  
Most of the LIPIA students oppose liberalism promoted young Muslim 
intellectuals associated with Islamic Liberal Network (JIL). This issue is particularly 
emotional as its main figure, Ulil Abshar Abdallah, previously studied at LIPIA. Having 
a traditionalist NU background, Ulil continued his education at LIPIA but dropped out 
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before he finished it. This opposition is found in their personal blogs, facebook, and 
twitter. Some students even publish books to oppose the danger of liberal Islam. The 
controversy of Ulil does not only attract LIPIA students, it also divided Muslim groups 
into two opposing camps. The opponent camp even issued a fatwa of murdering Ulil.  
A number of student organizations such as Hizb al-Tahrir, KAMMI (Indonesian 
Muslim Student Action Union), HMI (Indonesian Student Association) are found within 
the LIPIA. KAMMI is the largest student organization which has link with Welfare and 
Justice Party (PKS), an Islamic political party which produce important politicians and 
bureaucrats. It is obvious that most of the students support Islamism, that Islam 
becoming the alternative system for the ummah. However, support for Islamism has 
recently eroded, as more people believe in democracy and civil rights.  Despite LIPIA 
still play an important role in transmitting Islamism and Salafism, its influence is 
particularly limited within a relatively small groups of Muslim communities. Its 
position is really marginal in term of reproducing Islamic knowledge within larger 
Muslim audiences. Most of the Muslim people still regard the prominence of state 
Islamic universities in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.  
LIPIA has played an important role in creating Salafi schools in the country. 
There have been dozens of Salafi schools built in the country over the last two decades. 
These schools are linked to LIPIA in one way or another. Most of them are found in 
Java. Looking at their bases, it is obvious that the Salafis have been successful in 
creating its network in non-traditionalist NU strongholds. In West Java, they created 
network in Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Ciamis, Sukabumi, and Bogor. In Central 
Java, they created network in Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Magelang, Salatiga.  
In the aftermath of Aceh Tsunami in 2005, the Salafi created network in Sumatra 
especially in Banda Aceh. Working with various Islamic reliefs, they bought lands and 
built mosque, schools, and boarding schools. It is clear that the Salafi joined the 
humanitarian project together with other Islamic organizations and this project linked 
them to broader international financial sources. In Sulawesi, the Salafi network is found 
in Makassar. This network is made, among others, by Wahdah Islamiyah, a leading 
Salafi organization in the region. From Makassar, the network is further developed to 
Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. It is important to say that Wahdah is founded by the 
LIPIA graduates and has the largest network in eastern Indonesia.  
It is becoming clear that the Salafis have successfully created network in 
province, city, town, and district. This success cannot be separated from two modernist 
organizations, Muhammadiyah and Persis. In the grass root level, the Salafis gain strong 
support from these organizations. They pave the way for the Salafis to advocate their 
ideologies. This may not be surprising if one recalls that both Muhammadiyah and 
Persis have the same spirit of reform. At organizational level, the Salafis, 
Muhammadiyah and Persis have made joint project on education. The agreement is that, 
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while the Salafis provide fund for building schools, mosques, and dorms, the 
Muhammadiyah and Persis provide lands. This project has been going on in several 
campuses.  
It is found that the Salafis survive due to strong support of campus. The Salafis 
are in fact students previously studied at various campuses in the city. They converted 
to Salafism for several reason. In most cases, they converted due to willingness to seek 
for true Islam. In some cases they converted due to friendship, family ties and marriage. 
This fact also reveals the idea that Salafism links to student movements of the 1980s. 
This period witnessed a shift of paradigm after the student movements being crushed by 
the New Order regime. Many Salafi members I talked with in this region were former 
students of Gajah Mada University, the main campus in the city. They are now 
becoming active members of Salafi communities. This is the reason why Salafi enclaves 
are found around the city such as Piyungan, Banguntapan, and Kaliurang. The same 
pattern can be found in Surakarta, about fifty kilometers from Yogya to the north. In 
this city, a relatively big Salafi enclave is found. They establish schools, Islamic 
boarding schools, etc. Many of them are former students of various campuses in this 
city such as State University of Surakarta (UNS).  
The Salafi communities consist of well-educated persons, mostly of biology, 
physics, chemistry, and math backgrounds. They are now serving as doctor, paramedic, 
engineer, and scientist. These person are working together with those who have 
religious knowledge popularly called ustadz (teacher in Arabic). They previously 
studied at various universities in Saudi Arabia. While the first group are using their 
knowledge and skills to develop the movement further, the second are giving legitimacy 
to the movement attracting wider Muslim audiences. This is the reason why Salafi 
movements are so extensive and have far-reaching consequences.  
In the following sections, I want to briefly discuss the joint project between the 
Salafis and the modernist Muhammadiyah and Persis. This is one of the largest Salafi 
network in the country that shapes many aspects of Muslim communities. As I said 
earlier, the LIPIA graduates link local Indonesian organizations to wider financial 
resources. Thanks to them, many relief organizations create their local branches in 
Jakarta and make humanitarian programs. These programs includes education, health, 
social and economic programs, the construction of mosque and madrasa, the distribution 
of the Koran and Islamic books, the distribution of sacrified animal, and the donation of 
food for during Ramadhan.  
Muhammadiyah and Persis are the main modernist organizations in Indonesia 
which have been active so far. Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah has been active on 
education and social projects. Persis was founded in 1923. It had the same concerns 
with those of Muhammadiyah. While Muhammadiyah has been successful in 
establishing schools and universities, Persis had been stuck due to its rigidity. It had 
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been focusing on eradicating bid’ah and given little attention to social and education 
program.  Both organizations are seen as having abandoned reform issues which 
previously became the main important agenda. This fact made the leaders of both 
organizations really concerned. It is frequently heard both organizations did not have 
good prayer leaders (imam), their Qur’anic recitations really bad. It is also heard that it 
is really difficult to find a preacher for Friday sermon.  
Muhammadiyah and Persis made cooperations with Middle East charity 
organizations to build Qur’anic schools across the country. These schools are largely to 
train religious functionaries (prayer leaders, preachers, Qur’anic teachers, religious 
teachers). In less than a decade, there have been a number of institutes specializing on 
Islamic studies and memorizing of the Qur’an. They are built in Jakarta, Bandung, 
Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Malang, Medan, Palembang, Batam, 
Mataram, Palu, Lampung, etc. After completing their training, students are to be sent to 
areas for religious promulgation. Excellent students are given scholarship to continue 
their advanced studies in Saudi Arabia.  
The fact that Muhammadiyah and Persis revitalized tajdid (reform) demonstrates 
that this is the most salient feature of Salafi organizations. This is totally in opposition 
to the arguments proposed by many scholars that Salafism is form of Saudi global 
politics. While political patronage between Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Salafi 
organizations is obvious, this is by no means that they do not have their own agenda. To 
some extent, they enjoy a great deal of independence so that they can create their own 
agenda.  Equally important is that Saudi financial supports and other Middle East 
countries are limited. They are usually given for initial steps mostly for mosque and 
school constructions. Once the projects are completed, local organizations should be 
looking for other resources for survival. In the following sections, I want to briefly 
describe the backgrounds of LIPA students to determine its role in the current 
Indonesian Salafi Islam.  
LIPA has become the main destination for Muslim youths especially with rural 
backgrounds. It gives stipend for 200 Saudi riyals every month for entire students. It 
also gives all the textbooks for the students for free. This offer means a lot for those 
who could not afford high education in public and private universities. Some 
requirements are applicable for applicants. They should at least memorize three chapters 
of the Holy Koran (the entire Koran consisting of thirty chapters) by the time they 
register. In each semester students should add one more chapter. Hifdz al-Qur’an 
(Memorization of the Koran) is one the traditional methods in Muslim communities 
available until nowadays. Some students claim that they also memorize the Sunnah of 
the Prophet Muhammad. The applicants are also required to submit a recommendation 
(tazkiyah) either by persons or institutions which have good reputations. Hand-written 
recommendations are preferable. Recommendation should be personal and informal. 
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Since the institute creates networks based on personal or informal connections, 
recommendations made by LIPIA alumnis or Saudi-link institutions are highly 
considered.  
 
The Statistics of LIPIA Students (Total 2350 in 2012) 
School of Origin Economic Background Place of 
origin 
Sex 
islami
c high 
school 
islamic 
boardin
g school 
public 
schoo
l 
peasan
t 
small 
businessma
n 
labo
r 
teache
r 
othe
r 
rura
l 
urba
n 
Male  
88 % 
45 % 39% 16% 30% 37% 7% 5% 21% 75% 25% Femal
e 
12%  
 
Concluding Remarks 
It is obvious that the foundation of LIPIA has political elements. From 
Indonesian side, it is an attempt to support Islamic movements after Islam politics being 
blocked by Suharto. From Saudi side, it is a form of political accommodation of the 
state toward the ulama. Through LIPIA, the Saudi state can provide more opportunities 
for the ulama to flourish who in turn provide legitimacy for the state. LIPIA is an 
Islamic institution consistent using traditional Islamic scholarship especially those of the 
Hanbalite schools of thought. This is reflected in the entire curriculum the LIPIA has for 
its students. Despite other Sunni madhhab are taught, they are limited to literature which 
are considered relevant for the transmission of knowledge the LIPIA promotes. 
Notwithstanding this, the diversity of knowledge is taking place as the institute has a 
limitation to control students. This enables them to create interactions with other groups 
who have different knowledge which in turn affect theirs. Politization of knowledge 
takes place due to the fact that actors have different social and historical backgrounds. 
Actors create knowledge for their own benefits. Moreover, the different social and 
economic status between actors also contributes to this diversity.  
The discussion about Salafism frequently stems from a monolithic perspective 
which asserts that this Sunni sect is religiously puritan, unchanged, and opposes any 
possibility of differentiating knowledge. While this judgment is baseless, my 
ethnographic project shows that Wahdah Islamiyah, one of the Salafi organization in 
Indonesia has successfully bypassed its critical juncture and moved itself to a wider 
spectrum of knowledge. It is necessary to note that the Salafis are not in opposition 
against modernization. What becomes their concerns is that modernity should be based 
on Islamic ethics. At this point what is more interesting and more relevant to discuss is 
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that the Salafis seek to push the Islamic traditions and practices to the center and 
challenge modernity.  
The assumption that Salafi groups are dependent on Saudi funds is not supported 
by empirical bases. This relates to the nature of donation itself. It is true that charities 
are distributed to the Salafi groups. But they are limited and are only used at the initial 
step. Moreover, the Saudi philanthropists define religious charity in a very strict 
manner. They would only give donation for religious construction as the Prophet 
Muhammad said so. Most of the funds are largely used for mosque and school 
construction, others for orphans, fasting meals, the distribution of the Holy Qur’an and 
religious books. This means that once the Salafi have had their own infrastructures, they 
have to be self-reliant, which means that they have to pay for the establishment. Based 
on my observations, one of the strategies the Salafi makes to resolve this problem is by 
inviting and involving their member to take parts on organizational responsibilities. 
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